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Summary: Recent developments in macroeconomics and macroeconomic
policy, what has come to be known as “New Consensus in Macroeconomics”,
downgrades the role of fiscal policy and upgrades that of monetary policy. This 
contribution aims to consider this particular contention by focusing on fiscal
policy. We consider fiscal policy within the current “new consensus” theoretical
framework, which views fiscal policy as ineffective, and argue that it deserves a 
great deal more attention paid to it than it has been recently. We review and
appraise recent and not so recent theoretical and empirical developments on
the fiscal policy front. The possibility of fiscal and monetary policy coordination 
is proposed and discussed to conclude that it deserves a great deal more at-
tention and careful consideration than it has been given to in the past. Our
overall conclusion is that discretionary application of fiscal and monetary policy
in a coordinated and focused manner as a tool of macroeconomic policy de-
serves serious attention paid to it than hitherto.
Key words: Fiscal policy, New consensus macroeconomics, Coordination of 
monetary and fiscal policy. 
JEL: E62, H30.
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This contribution suggests that fiscal policy, as a tool of macroeconomic policy, de-
serves a great deal more attention paid to it than it has been recently. This contribu-
tion is, therefore, in full agreement with the IMF Managing Director when he asks 
the question, “What about fiscal policy?”, and the answer he provides, namely that 
“Under the old paradigm, fiscal policy was definitely the neglected child of the poli-
cy family. Its role was limited to automatic stabilizers – letting budget deficits move 
up and down with the cycle – and discretionary policy was regarded with deep suspi-
cion. But fiscal policy had a Sleeping Beauty moment during the crisis – with mone-
tary policy running out of steam, and with the financial system on its knees, the for-
gotten tool arrived to prop up aggregate demand and save the world from an econom-
ic freefall. We need to rethink fiscal policy” (Dominique Strauss-Kahn 2011, p. 3). 
This is precisely what is attempted in this contribution. But we go further, nonethe-
less, and argue that coordination of fiscal and monetary policies is both possible and 
desirable.  
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We examine in this paper the role of fiscal policy as a macroeconomic instru-
ment of stabilization policy. This policy has been downgraded in recent economic 
policy discussions (see, for example Philip Arestis 2007), although the empirical evi-
dence on the effectiveness of fiscal policy is not always supportive of this view (see, 
for example, Arestis 2008). We would, thus, suggest that although problems would 
always prevail on the policy arena, fiscal policy does not deserve to be so down-
graded as in recent policy contributions. The complexity of the theoretical arguments 
and the difficulty of arriving at clear-cut empirical results notwithstanding, the analy-
sis in this contribution suggests that fiscal policy can be an effective instrument of 
regulating the level of aggregate demand. This is particularly so when fiscal policy is 
properly co-ordinated with monetary policy. It would appear to be the case that co-
ordination of fiscal and monetary policies appears to gain a great deal of support. 
While net government spending adds an equal quantity of net financial assets 
to the combined non-government sectors by identity, the impact of fiscal policy on 
aggregate demand and economic activity depends heavily on the theoretical model 
and its assumptions about the real world where the policy is implemented. In the old 
macroeconomic models with sluggish prices, fiscal policy has positive demand im-
plications. Expansionary fiscal policy adds to aggregate spending, and allows de-
mand-constrained firms to sell more output, thereby increasing income and employ-
ment. The inflexibility of prices due to mark-up pricing makes output demand deter-
mined. Prices adjust gradually and they follow cost-push increases in wages as cap-
tured in some versions of the Phillips-curve type of specifications. The fiscal policy 
multiplier is positive, although its size can be affected by a number of factors, of 
which the main ones are: productive capacity close to full use; higher interest rates 
from anticipated central bank interest rate changes that may crowd out private de-
mand; fiscal policies that may cause the central bank to implement higher interest 
rates, reflecting higher risk premia; currency depreciation in a flexible exchange rate 
open economy; composition of the fiscal measure, where government spending is 
thought to be more effective than tax changes. These factors are likely to produce a 
positive, but small, fiscal policy multiplier. We examine carefully these factors in 
what follows in our attempt to defend the proposition that fiscal policy is a powerful 
tool of macroeconomic stabilization. It is amazing actually that despite the use of 
fiscal policy following the crisis that emerged in August 2007, which saved the world 
from the second “Great Depression” and produced only the “Great Recession”, full 
faith in fiscal policy is not there. In this sense the statement by Strauss-Kahn (2011), 
mentioned above, is very apt.   
We begin by a appraising the recent theoretical developments and empirical 
findings on the fiscal policy front in Section 2. This is followed by a discussion of 
“What role for fiscal policy”, which is the main theme of Section 3. Finally, Section 
4 summarises the argument and concludes. 
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2. Recent Theoretical and Empirical Developments 
 
2.1 The Issues 
 
There is a view in macroeconomic policy debate associated with the New Consensus 
in Macroeconomics that fiscal policy is ineffective (see, for example, Arestis 2008).
1 
The rationalization of this proposition relies essentially on three assumptions: that 
households optimize intertemporally, that households are not subject to any liquidity 
constraints, and that households are able to anticipate intertemporal financial con-
straints (see Richard Hemming, Michael Kell, and Selma Mahfouz 2002, for a survey 
of both the theoretical arguments and the empirical findings). In Hemming, Kell, and 
Mahfouz (op. cit.) the empirical evidence reviewed is not in favour of using fiscal 
policy as a stabilization instrument of policy.  
However, more recently that unfavourable empirical evidence on fiscal policy 
has been questioned (see, for example, Bas van Aarle and Harry Garretsen 2003). 
Studies have actually produced results that are contrary to the propositions of the 
New Consensus in Macroeconomics on the issue of the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
(Goran Hjelm 2002). Indeed, there have been studies that advocate greater emphasis 
on fiscal policy as a key economic policy tool in macroeconomic stabilization and 
that fiscal policy is more effective than previously thought (Simon Wren-Lewis 
2000; Christopher Allsopp and David Vines 2005; Paul Krugman 2005; Campbell 
Leith and Wren-Lewis 2005). We explore these more recent contributions in what 
follows.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Developments 
 
Recent developments on the effectiveness of fiscal policy conclude that incorporating 
additional assumptions to the theoretical model of the New Consensus in Macroeco-
nomics type, implies favourable results for fiscal policy. The most important of 
which can be succinctly and briefly summarized (see, for example, Dennis Botman 
and Manmohan S. Kumar 2006). Overlapping generation models in the tradition of 
Olivier J. Blanchard (1985) and Philippe Weil (1989), which enable the relaxation of 
the Ricardian equivalence assumption, is probably the most important one. Under 
such circumstances, a short-planning horizon by households is evident so that inter-
temporal smoothing of consumption is not possible. This implies that even temporary 
changes in fiscal policy affect household decisions to consume and work. Another 
assumption is that of liquidity-constrained households, consistent with the evidence 
that even in developed countries up to a third of households do not have sufficient 
access to financial markets (Botman and Kumar 2006). Under such circumstances, 
changes in fiscal policy that affect household disposable income would have signifi-
cant real effects. Similarly, when firms are credit constrained (Philippe Aghion et al. 
2005) fiscal policy can have positive effects on productivity growth through enhanc-
ing firms’ ability to finance “innovative investment”. Still another feature is the en-
dogenisation of labour supply and capital accumulation. Since they are affected by 
                                                        
1 John B. Taylor (2000) is, however, an exception amongst the proponents of the New Consensus in Ma-
croeconomics who believe that fiscal policy is ineffective.  
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after-tax real wage and after-tax rate of interest, respectively, changes in fiscal 
stance, as they affect after-tax real wage and the rate of interest, can have real ef-
fects.
2 
There is the further argument that the experience of a number of countries, es-
pecially developing, suggests that fiscal policy is in practice pro-cyclical rather than 
counter-cyclical there. This means that budget deficit, as percentage of GDP, in-
creases in booms, but decreases in recessions. This is contrary to the counter-cyclical 
case where the budget deficit, as a share of GDP, decreases during booms but in-
creases in recessions (Graciela L. Kaminsky, Carmen R. Reinhart, and Carlos A. 
Vegh 2004; Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini 2005). The pro-cyclical argument 
applies particularly to the discretionary changes in fiscal policy, but would not apply 
in the case of the operation of the automatic stabilisers, which provide a counter-
cyclical component of fiscal policy. Torsten Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Alesi-
na and Tabellini (2005) resort to a political agency problem to explain it. In countries 
where voters lack significant information, and are faced with corrupt governments 
that use parts of government revenue for unproductive public consumption, pro-
cyclical fiscal behaviour is possible. Voters demand higher utilities for themselves, 
especially so under booming conditions. They are not irrational; they merely lack full 
information of the ability of the government to satisfy their demands without creating 
budget deficits. The government is forced to borrow to satisfy voter demands, for 
otherwise there is the fear of future electoral losses. The more corrupt the country is, 
the more pro-cyclicality may be observed. In fact, pro-cyclical behaviour is mainly 
observed in countries with widespread corruption. Where governments are subject to 
“check and balances”, voters would not impart pro-cyclicality to fiscal policy.
3 In 
fact, under conditions of recession corrupt governments are assumed to be able to 
reduce public deficits in the absence of voter pressure. 
Despite these favourable contributions to fiscal policy discussions, it is the 
case that proponents of fiscal policy ineffectiveness would argue that there are per-
ceived risks in the use of fiscal policy as a stabilization instrument and it would be a 
great deal better not to use fiscal policy for this purpose. These arguments concen-
trate on the following three propositions: (i) solvency and sustainability: proponents 
continually warn that deficits are unsustainable and that national solvency is at risk. 
It is true that “if solvency is satisfied, it is not clear why one should worry about sus-
tainability. Presumably the real value of sustainability tests is that solvency is an elu-
sive concept, and can always invoke solvency by appealing to some change in spend-
ing or taxation far into the future. But markets are not interested in the distant future, 
and for them sustainability is an important element of information” (Roberto Perotti 
2007, p. 14). But, then, the only risk of deficits may just be inflation and balance-of-
payments changes in view of their contribution to high demand stimulation. It is also 
                                                        
2 Alan Blinder (2006) argues on similar grounds against the “Ricardian Equivalence” principle. It is 
based on the unrealistic theoretical assumptions of long-time horizons, perfect foresight, perfect capital 
markets and the absence of liquidity constraints.   
3 Alesina and Tabellini (2005) note that pro-cyclicality can only materialise in democratic regimes. In a 
dictatorship where corruption may be thriving, voters cannot influence fiscal decisions and thus pro-
cyclicality would not be observed.  
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true to say that following the financial crises of the 1990s, many developing coun-
tries were thought of as sacrificing the potential of their long-term growth in their 
attempt to appear as fiscal disciplined (especially so under the pressures by interna-
tional organisations), essentially because of the unfounded fears of fiscal unsustaina-
bility; (ii) generational issues: “we are leaving this debt to our children” is heard re-
peatedly. But then at the macro level each year's GDP gets distributed to whoever is 
alive, and the distribution process is under the full control of the government at any 
time; and (iii) financial burdens and danger of high interest rates due to deficits. This 
is not correct for the simple reason that government spending is not operationally 
revenue constrained. Government can spend whatever it wants regardless of whether 
it is in surplus or deficit. Indeed, the government sets the interest rate it pays on its 
debt, not the market. 
We examine in the sub-section that follows immediately some of the empirical 
aspects and developments.  
 
2.3 Empirical Developments 
 
2.3.1 Evidence on Ricardian vs Non-Ricardian Behaviour 
 
An interesting recent study on the possible effects of government spending on private 
consumption in the case of the euro area is Günter Coenen and Roland Straub (2005). 
The novelty of this study is that it attempts to resolve the contradiction between the 
typical predictions of the theoretical models, which conclude that government ex-
penditure has a strong negative effect on consumption, with that of the empirical lite-
rature that concludes on a positive or at least not significantly negative effect on con-
sumption of a government expenditure change. The study concludes that the evi-
dence does not validate the predictions of the theoretical models. In view of this find-
ing, Coenen and Straub (op. cit.) rely on the Gregory N. Mankiw (2000) study where 
the argument is advanced that models that attempt to study the effects of fiscal policy 
should allow for two types of households. One type of households (the “Ricardian” 
households) are those that behave in an optimizing, fully forward manner, by trading 
in asset and other markets and are, thus, able to smooth consumption over time; these 
households hold expectations about the future, which are essentially consistent with 
the assumptions of the models in question.  
Another type of households (the “non-Ricardian” households) follow non-
optimizing simple rules of thumb (they do not optimize intertemporally or intratem-
porally), cannot and do not participate in asset markets, and they merely consume 
their net-of-tax disposable income; their expectations of the future, therefore, need 
not be consistent with the assumptions of the models in question. There is actually 
empirical evidence that supports the contention that a significant proportion of con-
sumers and firms are actually non-Ricardian in that they are not especially forward-
looking or their behaviour is constrained (for example, evidence suggests that many 
households have little wealth, or are financially constrained, to be able to undertake 
intertemporal consumption smoothing). This finding is also supported by survey-
based evidence (John Y. Campbell and Mankiw 1989; Mankiw 2000; HM Treasury 
2003).   
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Coenen and Straub (2005) also rely on a study by Jordi Galí, David López-
Salido, and Javier Vallés (2004), where a model is put forward that allows for the 
coexistence of non-Ricardian and Ricardian households and their interaction with 
firms that change prices infrequently and a fiscal authority that issues debt to finance 
part of its expenditure. This study concludes that calibrating such a model provides 
support to the evidence of a positive impact of government expenditure shocks on 
consumption. The study by Coenen and Straub (2005) proceeds to include both Ri-
cardian and non-Ricardian households in an extended version of the euro area sto-
chastic dynamic general equilibrium model developed by Frank Smets and Raf Wou-
ters (2003),
4 and also employs Bayesian inference methods.
5 The presence of non-
Ricardian households is crucial. The quantitative impact of government spending on 
consumption is higher as compared to the benchmark case without non-Ricardian 
households.  
Nonetheless, the chance of government expenditure crowding-in consumption 
is rather small in view of the relatively low share of non-Ricardian households as-
sumed in the study. However, the possibility of crowding-in is strengthened once it is 
recognized that the presence of non-Ricardian households and their behaviour can 
have significant effects on that of the Ricardian households. To the extent that the 
increase in consumption of non-Ricardian households following a budget deficit, 
impacts on the income stream of the Ricardian households, then crowding-in be-
comes a distinct possibility. Further possibilities suggest themselves. For example, 
allowing for an endogenous response of the long-run government debt-to-GDP ratio 
to persistent government spending may enhance our understanding of the empirical 
dimension of the problem. Furthermore, modifying the assumption of government 
expenditure evolving exogenously over time, so that agents would form expectations 
about government spending shocks, would give the model more realism and could 
produce results that strengthen the impact of government spending shocks. 
 
2.3.2 Size of Models Employed 
 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) employ the Structural VAR (SVAR) approach in study-
ing the quantitative impact of fiscal policy. They argue that this approach is superior 
to those that utilise large-scale econometric models or reduced-forms. Large-scale 
econometric models “largely postulate rather than document an effect of fiscal policy 
on activity” (p. 1), while the reduced-form approach registers the effect of a sum-
mary statistic of fiscal policy, and yet no theory suggests this is pertinent. The SVAR 
approach is argued to be more appropriate in the study of fiscal policy simply be-
cause, unlike monetary policy for example, decision and implementation lags imply 
that there is no response of fiscal policy to economic activity. So that fiscal shocks 
                                                        
4 The study by Smets and Wouters (2003) is used as a benchmark specification in the Coenen and Straub 
(2005) study. The latter is an augmented specification with non-Ricardian households in relation to Smets 
and Wouters (2003). 
5 Bayesian inference methods rely on the use of prior information obtained from earlier studies in the 
estimation of a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model. Such methods are particularly useful when 
the sample period of the data is short, and also when it is necessary to solve highly non-linear estimation 
relationships.  
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can be identified and their dynamic effects on economic activity can be traced 
through the SVAR approach. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) employ post-war US data 
along with SVAR to conclude that spending multipliers for consumption and output 
are anything between one third and unity.  
However, Perotti (2005) and Ilian Mihov (2003), using VAR-based evidence, 
argue that after 1980 the effectiveness of fiscal policy weakened substantially in the 
US. Three possible explanations of this change have been put forward. One relates to 
the financial liberalization era, which took place at the time. The increasing asset 
market participation has enabled households to smooth consumption in the desired 
way, thereby influencing the impact of fiscal policy. Another explanation refers to 
the increasing use of monetary policy since the 1980s in relation to the pre-1980s. It 
is true that a considerable change has taken place in the way the nominal interest rate 
is adjusted in response to expected inflation; monetary policy has been more hawkish 
ever since the 1980s. And a third explanation emphasizes the change in the degree of 
deficit financing, which has assumed more persistence post-1980. These explanations 
imply that while fiscal policy has a strong and persistent effect on economic activity, 
this is less significant and persistent post-1980. Florin O. Bilbiie, André Meier, and 
Gernot J. Müller (2006) attempt to throw light on the empirical support of the three 
explanations just summarized. They conclude that increased asset market participa-
tion accounts for some of the change, while the degree of deficit financing is crucial. 
But the key quantitative factor is, in their empirical findings, the increasing use of 
monetary policy post-1980. But complementarity of the three factors is also very im-
portant.  
 
2.3.3 Public Investment 
 
Of equal, if not more, importance for fiscal policy is public investment, which as-
sumes particular significance in view of the emphasis placed upon it in the UK over 
the recent past. “Golden rule” is the term used by the UK Treasury in its approach to 
public investment. Government deficit should only be undertaken for public invest-
ment but the current account should be balanced over the cycle, implying a balanced 
current account. This “golden rule” is also associated with a “sustainable investment 
rule”, which limits net public debt to a “stable and prudent level” of no more than 40 
per cent of GDP (HM Treasury 2002).
6 A question in this context is whether the 
“golden rule” can ensure a sufficient level of public investment without hurting the 
sustainability of public finances. One might also question whether it can insure ade-
quate aggregate demand in light of geometrically increasing accumulation in 
pensions. 
Recent research appears to be supportive of assigning a significant role to pub-
lic investment. In their attempt to test for these propositions, Jérôme Creel, Paola 
Monperrus-Veroni, and Francesco Saraceno (2006) elaborate on the Blanchard and 
                                                        
6 Other countries have adopted “fiscal rules”, which are different from the UK’s “golden rule”. Examples 
range from the European Union’s “Stability and Growth Pact”, which expects the member countries not 
to exceed 3% deficit to GDP, to other cases such as Australia and New Zealand, where procedural and 
quantitative rules are typically combined (Luis Servén 2007). One may also mention the fiscal rule of 
Chile, which constrains the cyclically adjusted budget surplus to be no less than 1 percent of GDP.      
150  Philip Arestis 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 2, pp. 143-156 
Perotti (2002) approach, which, as implied above, popularized the VAR technique in 
a short-run analysis to account for the long-run properties of fiscal policies. Creel et 
al. (op. cit.) account for debt dynamics in the case of a closed economy, and by utiliz-
ing the SVAR approach, they conclude that public investment, and current outlays, in 
the UK have positive and permanent effects on real GDP. Blanchard and Francesco 
Giavazzi (2004) utilizing the mechanism that the golden rule allows spreading the 
cost of investment over time, show that reformulating the Stability and Growth Pact 
along the golden rule premise would allow improvement to the European Union pub-
lic infrastructure investment without violating the deficit limits. 
The experience of other countries in relation to public investment is interest-
ing. A recent World Bank study (Servén 2007) shows that in the process of fiscal 
adjustment in developed and Latin America countries, over the last twenty years or 
so, public investment, which represents a small percentage of overall public expendi-
ture and a small fraction of GDP for all countries, fell more abruptly than public con-
sumption. In the case of the European Union, this evidence suggests that fulfillment 
of the Maastricht deficit criterion promoted the decline of public investment in these 
countries. In Latin America public infrastructure investment as a percentage of GDP 
fell when the percentage of public consumption to GDP rose.
7 A similar pattern is 
also evident in the case of virtually all countries around the world.      
 
2.3.4 Counter-Cyclical vs Pro-Cyclical Assumptions 
 
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) employ data on 87 countries over the period 1960 to 
1999 to test the counter-cyclicality and the pro-cyclicality assumptions discussed in 
Sub-section 2.2. They conclude that in the OECD countries fiscal policy is counter-
cyclical, while in 36 out of 64 non-OECD countries pro-cyclicality is confirmed. The 
36 countries are essentially Sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries, the-
reby supporting the political agency phenomenon in the case of these countries. They 
also depend on the nature of the tax system and on the expenditure system – a pro-
gressive tax and social security system would aid counter-cyclical budgets whilst a 
regressive system would point in the other direction. It is also shown that credit con-
straints impose obstacles to developing country governments to borrow the desired 
amounts, but it does not appear to be as a significant variable of pro-cyclicality as the 
political agency variable. 
These results, however, may very well reflect the fact that developed and de-
veloping countries are subject to different shocks (see Galí and Perotti 2003; Gita 
Gopinath 2004; and Roberto Rigobon 2004, in their respective comments on Ka-
minsky et al. 2004). Utilizing a sample of industrialized countries and developing 
countries, Galí and Perotti (2003), Gopinath (2004) and Rigobon (2004) confirm the 
observation to which we have just referred. They find that there is significant differ-
                                                        
7 Public infrastructure investment is defined in the case of Latin America to include land transportation, 
power, telecommunications and water and sanitation (Servén 2007, p. 2, fn. 5).  
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ence in the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy in the two groups of countries. This 
they interpret as a consequence of the different shocks to which the two types of 
economies are subjected.
8 
 
2.3.5 Measurement Issues 
 
An important and relevant point is the extent to which budget deficits are measured 
appropriately in the studies referred to above. Robert Eisner (1989) was very persis-
tent on the importance of proper definitions. In fact in Eisner and Paul J. Pieper 
(1984), the point is made very well: “an appropriately adjusted high-employment 
budget turns out to have been not in deficit in recent years, as usually supposed, but 
in considerable surplus. The view that fiscal policy has generally been too easy and 
overstimulatory is contradicted” (p. 23). In the same study it is also argued that “offi-
cial measures of the federal debt and budget deficits are misleading by any of several 
reasonable standards. Gross public debt figures ignore financial asset accumulation 
as well as the real assets, which have contributed to a growing government net worth. 
Budget flows have failed to distinguish between current and capital accounts, and 
measures of surplus and deficit have been inconsistent with changes in the real value 
of net debt” (Eisner and Pieper, op. cit., p. 23). 
It is clear from the discussion in this section that fiscal policy does have a sig-
nificant role to play in macroeconomic stabilization, provided fiscal measures are 
appropriately measured.  
This conclusion leads to the question of the precise role of fiscal policy as a 
stabilization instrument of macroeconomic policy. We discuss this issue in Section 3. 
 
3. What Role for Fiscal Policy? 
 
It clearly follows from the discussion so far that relevant exercises undertaken pro-
vide strong support to fiscal policy as an instrument of stabilization policy. This con-
clusion is strengthened by more recent findings, which are based on the value of the 
fiscal multipliers under conditions of coordination between fiscal and monetary poli-
cy. Gauti B. Eggertsson (2006) utilizing a calibrated model, not dissimilar in sub-
stance to the New Consensus in Macroeconomics, concludes that under fiscal and 
monetary policy coordination fiscal multipliers are higher than when no policy coor-
dination prevails. Indeed, they are bigger than those found in the traditional Keyne-
sian literature.
9 This large difference in fiscal multipliers is explained by the expecta-
                                                        
8 It is important to note, along with Kaminsky et al. (2004) and Perotti (2007) that the terminology on the 
issues discussed in the text is clear. For otherwise there could be ambiguity over the notions of counter- 
and pro-cyclical fiscal policy. When budget outcomes are expressed as percentage of GDP, changes in 
the deficit or surplus might be ambiguous. For example, when growth is low the budget deficit as a per-
centage of GDP could fall even if in absolute terms it decreases. It is for this reason that whenever the 
focus is on the potential contribution of fiscal policy to aggregate demand is at issue, it is better that the 
absolute amount is utilized to avoid such confusion.   
9 The fiscal multipliers reported in Eggertsson (2006) under fiscal and monetary policy coordination are 
3.4, in the case of the real spending multiplier, and 3.8, in the case of the deficit spending multiplier. 
When there is no policy coordination, i.e. when the central bank is “goal independent”, the real spending 
multiplier is unchanged, while the deficit spending multiplier is zero.  
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tions channel, which is very much emphasized in the Eggertsson (op. cit.) study. This 
channel works via inflation expectations. Fiscal expansion increases expectations 
about future inflation, real rate of interest is reduced (provided the central bank col-
laborates with the fiscal authority) and spending is stimulated. Expectations of future 
income also improve, thereby stimulating spending further. This result is particularly 
important in view of much current theory and practice that see fiscal policy better 
divorced from monetary policy. This contribution would suggest that macroeconomic 
stability is the joint responsibility of the monetary and fiscal authorities. Potentially 
destabilising behaviour by one authority can be offset by an appropriate stance of the 
other authority. Perhaps more importantly the monetary authority can trade off some 
inflation for lower unemployment, even in the long run. 
These particular policy prescriptions become increasingly of vital importance. 
The recent credit-crunch crisis testifies clearly to such a policy strategy. Sensible co-
ordination of fiscal policy and monetary policy should be the basis of a new policy 
framework. The risk of recession in the US, which could have worldwide implica-
tions, dictates such a combination of policies. Given the effectiveness of fiscal poli-
cy, which is crucially supported by recent theoretical and empirical developments as 
argued in this paper, and avoiding potential over-reaction by monetary policy, is 
what is desperately needed.
10 This should be supplemented by regulatory policy 
measures to introduce institutional changes that are required as recent experience 
demonstrates.
11 For example, using monetary policy to bail out the distressed bor-
rowers from the recent credit-crunched crisis would necessitate huge decreases in 
interest rates, which would not work in any case (see footnote 10), and would be in-
compatible with current monetary policy thinking in view of global inflationary pres-
sures.
12 Indeed, aggressive monetary policy might turn the credit-crunch episode of 
the summer of 2007 into a serious and wider financial crisis - excessively low inter-
est rates can easily create bubbles the burst of which would have devastating effects 
on the economy. 
Using subsidies to bail out the distressed borrowers would be a much better 
and efficient way of tackling the problem, thereby avoiding the various risks of mon-
etary policy over-reaction. In this way the fiscal stimulus would target those with low 
incomes and those that have suffered from the credit crunch of the summer of 2007. 
This would have to be accompanied by regulatory changes in the form of deposit 
insurance, and other similar measures, all designed to avoid the problems of what we 
now know as the credit-crunch crisis. 
 
                                                        
10 Over-reaction by monetary policy in this context is a dramatic reduction of interest rates, which would 
not be effective in that it would only work for non-distressed borrowers (who can undertake refinancing 
immediately), but not for distressed borrowers – they can only be helped by direct action on the fiscal 
front.  
11 Such institutional changes would reverse a number of changes that were introduced in the era of “fi-
nancial liberalisation”. This epoch has produced unparalleled financial crises since its inception in the 
1970s, culminating to the recent credit-crunch crisis of the summer of 2007.  
12 Interestingly enough, globalisation, which produced stable inflationary episodes through cheap goods, 
not such a long time ago, is now creating rising demand for resources with supply constraints, such as oil 
and food, which threaten to produce serious inflationary pressures.   
153  Fiscal Policy Is Still an Effective Instrument of Macroeconomic Policy 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 2, pp. 143-156
Coordination of fiscal and monetary policy does not imply that the respective 
authorities need to lose their “independence”. For example, this cooperation need not 
mean that central bank independence is reduced. So long as the fiscal and monetary 
authority have a common objective, for example maximisation of social welfare, this 
need not imply that the two authorities should lose their “independence” (Eggertsson 
2006). This is not dissimilar to Wren-Lewis’s (2000) proposal for delegating fiscal 
actions to an independent body, outside the government. This could take the form of 
a “fiscal regulator” with two objectives: to advise on short-run discretionary action 
and to supervise the long-run sustainability of the government finances. It is also ar-
gued that the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) can play such a 
role, alongside monetary policy. This is paramount in this view, given the require-
ment of proper coordination of fiscal and monetary policies (Wren-Lewis, op. cit., p. 
104).
13 In the same spirit of analysis, Ludger Linnemann and Andreas Schabert 
(2003), utilizing a model of wage and price stickiness, demonstrate that fiscal policy 
can affect output if the monetary authority does not react aggressively to output 
changes. Furthermore, in models where capital accumulation is also accounted for, as 
in Arestis, Michelle Baddeley, and Malcolm Sawyer (2007) for example, aggregate 
demand, which would now include investment expenditure more prominently, would 
be more susceptible than otherwise to changes in the rate of interest. This considera-
tion gives more credence to the proposition that coordination of fiscal and monetary 
policy becomes paramount. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
 
We have looked at recent developments on the fiscal policy front, which emanate 
from an attempt to change a number of relevant assumptions. Most important of 
these assumptions are the existence of Ricardian and non-Ricardian economic agents, 
as well as liquidity-constrained households, and the endogenization of labour supply 
and capital accumulation. The conclusions from this discussion are of two types. The 
first is that fiscal policy does have a significant role to play as an instrument of eco-
nomic policy. It is one of the crucial factors that determine the economic perfor-
mance of a country through its impact on allocation, distribution and stabilization. As 
such, fiscal policy is a key component of any macroeconomic framework alongside 
monetary policy. This leads us to the second major conclusion of this contribution. 
Co-ordination of fiscal and monetary policies is probably the best way forward in 
terms of macroeconomic stabilization; in doing so the authorities should employ a 
great deal of discretion in the application of such coordination. It should also be add-
ed that such coordination becomes even more effective when the fiscal and monetary 
authorities have a common objective, for example maximization of social welfare. 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 A number of authors have proposed delegating decisions on fiscal policy to “an independent fiscal 
policy committee” to improve its effectiveness and the financial discipline of the government. See HM 
Treasury (2003, p. 74) for a brief summary of a number of these propositions.  
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